 |
The
Somme
Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson
358pp. UNSW Press, Sydney, 2006 |
Available from HTANSW:
Standard
price $35.00 + postage (GST inclusive).
HTA NSW member price $27.00 + postage
(GST inclusive)
Steve
Dixon alerted me to this book when he spoke about it to
students at HTA’s recent conference and study day
at Wagga Wagga. I strongly support the view he put that
it is an interesting and important book for all of us
who are involved with teaching the Modern History core
study.
While
some might wonder if we really need yet another study
of the Battle of the Somme, I suggest that this book is
worth reading for two very good reasons. Firstly, in presenting
a detailed account of the battle the authors provide readers
with a very good opportunity to gain a greater understanding
of trench warfare in general, both from the point of view
of front line soldiers and the generals who were struggling
to develop tactics to deal with the stalemate. While not
being a huge fan of military history at the brigade level,
I found myself drawn into what is a compelling story.
Indeed, as with the great Shakespearean tragedies, there
were times when I was so engaged as to begin hoping against
inevitability and the futile outcome of the whole insane
affair.
An
even more significant reason for reading this book is
that it challenges a number of very well entrenched stereotypes
about the history of World War I. For example, the 2002
edition of the HTA Modern History Study Guide states that
‘Britain’s New Army marched forward in straight
lines with bayonets fixed, under orders to retain an orderly
progress … they were not trained well enough to
operate in any other way’. If Prior and Wilson are
right then this image of most British soldiers presenting
a slow moving, straight-line target to German machine
gunners is a myth. How it was created and perpetuated
makes for a fascinating case study in historiography.
Thus, if the editor and authors of HTA’s study guide
(and every other text on the market) are wrong then they
are in very good company, as Prior and Wilson highlight,
with historians such as Liddell Hart and John Terraine.
In
challenging the ‘grim depiction of British infantryman
reduced by their commanders to worse than pack animals’
the authors are not preparing the way for a more favourable
view of the commanders. If anything, in stripping the
analysis of long cherished sentiment, they have driven
home an even stronger indictment of British commanders.
One is left with a memorable comparison between Ludendorff’s
preparations for his relatively successful 1918 offensive
and Haig’s preparations for the Somme: ‘…
to carry his plan through, Haig (unlike Ludendorff) had
not assembled the largest number of guns seen on the Western
Front. He had assembled the largest number of horses.’
Paul Kiem, Trinity Catholic College, Auburn
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